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‘Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene’: Re-encountering Environmental 
Law and its ‘Subject’ with Haraway and New Materialism 
 
This chapter brings together critical scholarship concerning environmental law and its subject with 
Haraway’s reflections on the ‘Anthropocene’, as well as insights from New Materialism, in order to 
trouble some counter-productive and eco-destructive assumptions haunting the ‘Anthropos’ of the 
‘Anthropocene’. The author uses these reflections to suggest potential lines of thought for the re-
imagination of environmental law’s ‘subjects’ and for moving beyond the trajectories and tropes underlying 
environmental law in its manifestation as an intensifying form of neoliberal governmentality.  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter flirts with Donna Haraway’s framing of ‘Anthropocene, Capitalocene, 
Chthulucene’1 in order to reflect upon environmental law and its assumed ‘subject’. The 
chapter uses the threefold ‘cene’ iteration of its title to develop a progressively deepening 
critique of the assumptions underlying environmental law and its subject, read—in 
significant part here—as the Anthropos of the Anthropocene trope. The chapter then 
moves on to reflect on new materialist provocations concerning the possibility of a new 
materialist environmental legal imaginary.  
 
1. Haraway’s Framing: Three Stories 
 
For Haraway, the Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene are three framings of the 
contemporary epoch: ‘three stories that are too big, and also not big enough’.2 The 
‘Anthropocene’, as Haraway notes, is the current proposal put forward for naming the 
current epoch,3 though, as Haraway rightly argues, the epoch might better be named the 
‘Capitalocene’. The Chthulucene, Haraway’s third (and countervailing) figuration, is 
inspired by altogether different energies and ways of seeing and being—and could, she 
argues, produce ‘something—just maybe—more liveable’.4  
Haraway inaugurates her analysis by pointing to the intellectual revolution underway 
in the natural sciences—a revolution characterized by the convergence of two powerful 
understandings. The first understanding is that ‘individualism, methodological 
individualism and human exceptionalism’ are now ‘literally unthinkable’ for the most 
pioneering work conducted across the disciplines. The second is the insistence in the 
biological sciences that the ‘tissues of being anything at all’ are ineluctably caught up in a 
multi-species becoming—the long overdue recognition ‘that those who are have been in 
relationality all the way down’.5 How is it then, Haraway asks, that despite these two 
seismic shifts in intellectual and cultural understanding, the ‘Anthropocene’ is the name 
‘seriously proposed’ as the name for the present epoch? Why is the naming of the age 
thus dominated by ‘the figure of the “Anthropos”’—the very figure whose individualism, 
methodological individualism and exceptionalism are now rendered so unthinkable? 
 
2. Anthropocene: The Hierarchies of Anthropos 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See ‘Anthropocene, Capitolocene, Chthulucene: Staying with the Trouble’, a lecture given by Donna 
Haraway at University of California, Santa Cruz on 5th September 2014, available at 
https://vimeo.com/97663518 (last accessed 18th September 2015). 
2 Haraway, n 1 above, at 00:18. 
3 PJ Crutzen, ‘Geology of Mankind’ (2002) 23 Nature 415. 
4 Haraway, n 1 above, at 01:05. 
5 Ibid, 02:20. 
Haraway sets out in response to her own question both to ‘justify’ and to ‘trouble’ the 
human centrality figured by the terminology of the Anthropocene. 6   
  It is important to trouble this human centrality—and to trouble it, in part, for its 
failure to reflect the exclusions of the Anthropos itself. Crutzen’s famous 2002 
popularization of Stoermer’s original Anthropocene terminology7 presents ‘mankind’ as a 
Promethean species agent whose impacts operate at global scales and lock the planetary 
future onto a trajectory for which ‘[t]he impact of current human activities is projected to 
last over very long periods’.8 Crutzen reasons that 
[c]onsidering these and many other major and still growing impacts of human activities 
on earth and atmosphere, and at all, including global scales, it is thus more than 
appropriate to emphasise the central role of mankind in geology and ecology by using 
the term ‘Anthropocene’ for the current geological epoch.9 
Crutzen’s account now represents the mainstream account of the 
Anthropocene’s emergence, and it is an account, arguably, that exposes the distinctively 
Eurocentric origins of the new geological era characterized by ‘large-scale human 
modification of the Earth System, primarily in the form of climate change, the most 
salient and perilous transgression of Holocene parameters’.10 Perhaps the naming of the 
‘Anthropocene’ can be read as an admission, one marked by a problematic Eurocentric 
hubris, for Anthropos is an intrinsically Eurocentric, individualist and exceptionalist 
figuration.11 Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that the terminology of the ‘Anthropocene’, 
circling as it does around the Anthropos, reflects the historically persistent centrality of a 
particular kind of ‘human’ rather than a species conception.12  
  The ‘Anthropocene’—for all its universalistic talk of ‘humankind’ and of the 
collective action of humanity the species agent—signals a planetary crisis triggered by logics 
of action reflecting the prioritization of a far smaller category of humankind than 
‘humanity’ as a whole. It thus remains critically important to ask what exactly the 
‘Anthropos’ of the ‘Anthropocene’ includes and excludes. What privileges and violations 
are masked or performed by such terminology? The mainstream deployment of 
Anthropocene terminology attaches to a mainstream account of Anthropocene origins, 
which while contested, remains dominant—and relentlessly Eurocentric: This account 
‘represents an effort to expand (rather homogenized) European historical experiences, 
frameworks and chronologies onto the rest of the world … and hides a disturbing 
extension of colonial discourse into a postcolonial world’. 13  
  There is an important sense, then, in which the terminology of the 
‘Anthropocene’ simply extends the logics of Eurocentric human exceptionalism and 
methodological individualism—the self-same logics that gave rise to the Anthropocene 
crisis itself. Crutzen traces the Anthropocene’s emergence to markers in data ‘retrieved 
from glacial ice cores’ betraying a notable intensification of greenhouse gases (especially 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid, 03.23. 
7 Crutzen, n 3 above, 415. As Haraway notes, the term was originally coined by Eugene Stoermer to drive 
at anthropogenic causes of water acidification and shifts in the nature of life on earth: Haraway, n 1 above 
at 08.27. 
8 Crutzen, n 3 above, ibid. 
9 PJ Crutzen, ‘The Anthropocene’ in E Ehlers and T Krafft, Earth System Science in the Anthropocene (Berlin 
and Heidelberg: Springer, 2006) 13-18 at 16. 
10 A Malm and A Horborg, ‘The Geology of Mankind? A Critique of the Anthropocene Narrative’ (2014) 
1/1 The Anthropocene Review 62–69 at 63. 
11 A Grear, ‘Deconstructing Anthropos: A Critical Legal Reflection on “Anthropocentric” Law and 
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12 Ibid. 
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CO2, CH4, and N2O) dated from the eighteenth century. ‘Such a starting date’, he 
observes, ‘coincides with James Watt’s invention of the steam engine in 1782’.14 
Accordingly, Crutzen installs the ultimate icon of European rational and technical 
mastery—the steam engine—at the heart of the ‘standard Anthropocene narrative’.15 
Indeed, as Malm and Hornborg note, the steam engine is ‘often referred to [within 
mainstream Anthropocene discourse] as the one artifact that unlocked the potentials of 
fossil fuel energy and thereby catapulted the human species to full spectrum 
dominance’.16 Yet while steam-driven industrialization is at the heart of the dominant 
account, and despite the narrow class of European man at the heart of such industrial 
expansion, for Crutzen (and others) the Anthropocene also constructs a forward-facing 
sense of species-responsibility to act in the face of its looming global climate crisis.17 This 
claim could be seen as a call for the genesis of an eco-responsible Anthropocene 
environmental subject—and certainly a call for responsibility is important. Yet, there is 
good reason to be wary of the implicit universalism folded into such a call (and its related 
potential Anthropocene ethic) and imported, by implication, into the dominant 
Eurocentric account of Anthropocene inauguration.  
  It is important to pause, at this point, to draw explicit attention to the narrowness 
of the Anthropos. Indeed, Haraway argues that the best figuration for Anthropos is ‘fossil-
making man burning fossils’.18 ‘Fossil-making man burning fossils’ is scarcely 
representative of all humanity—even now. Let us therefore examine the implicit 
universality of Anthropocene ‘humanity’—whether implied by the species language of 
‘mankind’ as originator of the epoch or reflected in ‘humanity’s’ responsibility in the face 
of the looming climate crisis (the Anthropocene’s most deadly marker).  
  Critical theorists of all kinds tend to be suspicious, in all disciplinary traditions, of 
universalizing assumptions. Yet even critical theorists can be attracted to the allure of an 
Anthropocene universal as an important idea responding to the need for an 
Anthropocene ethic. Chakrabarty, one of the few critical theorists directly to engage the 
Anthropocene and its implications, suggests that the ‘crisis of climate change appeals to 
our sense of human universals while challenging at the same time our capacity for 
historical understanding’.19   
  Historical understanding is challenged, Chakrabarty argues, because climate 
scientists have ‘unwittingly destroying the artificial but time-honored distinction between 
natural and human histories’ and ‘the human being has become something much larger 
than the simple biological agent that he or she always has been. Humans now wield a 
geological force’20 as a collectivity. In response to this collective force of human species-
impact, Chakrabarty poses two questions to the idea of the Anthropocene human 
universal. First, he asks whether it is fair to include the ‘poor of the world’, whose carbon 
footprint is small, in the notion of responsibility for genesis of the Anthropocene.21 And 
secondly, he asks whether the climate crisis presents a role for a universal human species 
agent. Chakrabarty’s first question directs a powerful critical anxiety towards Crutzen’s 
easy-sounding assertion of future-facing Anthropocene species responsibility: Can a 
generalized notion of Anthropocene species responsibility (facing backwards, and thus 
by implication, forwards also) be so easily accepted? Or should there be a more carefully 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Crutzen, n 9 above, at 16. 
15 Malm and Hornborg, n 10 above, at 63. 
16 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
17 Crutzen, n 3 above. 
18 Haraway, n 1 above, at 10.02. 
19 D Chakrabarty, ‘The Climate of history: Four theses’ (2009) 35 Critical Inquiry 35: 197–222 at 201. 
20 Ibid, at 206. 
21 Ibid, at 217. 
calibrated attentiveness to unevenness?22 Chakrabarty’s first question sets up the answer 
to his second question. Chakrabarty is well aware of historical patterns of oppression, of 
global unevenness, but for him, climate change—unlike the crisis of capitalism—
necessitates embracing a negative universality because climate precarity co-situates us all 
in so far as there is no escape for the privileged. The climate crisis, Chakrabarty asserts, 
presents a role for a universal human species agent, because, he reasons, ‘[u]nlike in the 
crises of capitalism, there are no lifeboats here for the rich and the privileged (witness the 
drought in Australia or recent fires in the wealthy neighborhoods of California)’.23  
  Accordingly, while Chakrabarty clearly affirms the familiar critical hermeneutic of 
suspicion directed at the production of a universal ‘humanity’, suggesting—rightly—that 
it remains ‘an effective critical tool in dealing with national and global formations of 
domination’,24 he nevertheless argues that in the face of the climate crisis, the utility of 
this approach breaks down. This is because ‘inchoate figures of us all and other 
imaginings of humanity invariably haunt our sense of the current crisis’—and, because 
the longstanding wall between natural and human history is breached by the emergence 
of the Anthropocene, ‘we appear to have become one at the level of the species’.25 This, 
then, is a new universal born of the ‘emergent, new universal history of humans that 
flashes up in the moment of danger that is climate change’.26 It is, Chakrabarty insists,  
a question of a human collectivity, an us, pointing to a figure of the universal that 
escapes our capacity to experience the world. It is more like a universal that arises from a 
shared sense of a catastrophe. It calls for a global approach to politics without the myth 
of a global identity, for, unlike a Hegelian universal, it cannot subsume particularities. We 
may provisionally call it a ‘negative universal history’.27 
This is not universalism as usual. Particularities are not subsumed. Yet, despite 
Chakrabarty’s important critical rejection of the ‘the myth of a global identity’, an 
important question persists: ‘Is it not risky to accept the construction of a negative 
formation of humanity as a category that stretches to all human beings, all other differences 
notwithstanding?’28 And is it not equally risky, we might add, to construct a future-facing 
Anthropocene ethic addressing a human species responsibility all other differences 
nothwithstanding? 
  Focusing directly on Chakrabarty’s pivotal assertion that there are ‘no lifeboats 
here for the rich and privileged’, Malm and Hornborg point out that this assertion 
blatantly overlooks the realities of differentiated vulnerability on all scales of human 
society: witness Katrina in black and white neighborhoods of New Orleans, or Sandy in 
Haiti and Manhattan, or sea level rise in Bangladesh and the Netherlands, or practically 
any other impact, direct or indirect, of climate change. For the foreseeable future – 
indeed, as long as there are human societies on Earth – there will be lifeboats for the rich 
and privileged. If climate change represents a form of apocalypse, it is not universal, but 
uneven and combined: the species is as much an abstraction at the end of the line as at the source.29 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 On the centrality of unevenness to the global order see R Radhakrishnan, Theory in an Uneven World 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).  
23 Chakrabarty, n 19 above, at 221. Emphasis added. 
24 Ibid, 221. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid, 222. 
28 R Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), at 88. Emphasis original. 
29 Here the authors cite A Malm, ‘Sea wall politics: Uneven and combined protection of the Nile Delta 
coastline in the face of sea level rise’ (2013) 39 Critical Sociology 803–832; A Malm and S Esmailian, ‘Ways in 
The hermeneutics of suspicion, it turns out, cannot be so easily laid aside. And, 
relatedly, we can add that Anthropos cannot be assumed to represent ‘us all’ in our 
‘moment of danger’. There may indeed be a growing sense of catastrophe concerning the 
future of humanity as a species on earth, but that sense of catastrophe is not monolithic 
or evenly felt. Impending (and actual) climate catastrophe for some is most emphatically 
not what it is for others. Even the sense of catastrophe may not yet (if ever) be 
meaningfully shared. If anything, the Anthropocene present is marked by a rapidly 
expanding set of divisions: the rift between the richest and the rest; the multiplication of 
zones of exclusion and marginalization; deepening entanglements of oppression between 
marginalized humans, non-human animals and ecosystems at the hands of the neoliberal 
order; corporate land grabs forcing communities in the Global South off their lands in 
order to securitize the Global North; profoundly uneven distributions of vulnerability 
and resilience; and the intensifying eco-governmentality (and ‘neoliberalization of nature’) 
enacted by international environmental law and governance structures.  
  It seems implausible that the Anthropocene signals the emergence of a new 
universal—even a negative one—at least not yet—and despite the urgent need—as 
Haraway puts it—‘to be less parochial’.30 Parochiality—particularly when it comes to 
questions of distributive and environmental justice—seems if anything to intensify in 
response to climate-driven mass migrations, which are met by border-protective impulses 
and a generalized fear of ‘the other’. The recently erected fences and barbed wire in 
Europe eloquently endorse Malm and Hornborg’s critique of Chakrabarty’s assertion that 
there are no lifeboats here for the rich and privileged. The parochial grabbing of 
lifeboats, and the desperate consignment of refugees and migrants to distinctly leaky 
boats, if anything, seems virulent of late. Thus, while climate pressures certainly point to 
a broadening awareness of catastrophe— and perhaps, given the evidence of emergent 
post-capitalist modes of social organisation, might signal a more inclusive and empathic 
sense of ‘the human’ in the making—the patterns of Anthropos and the patterns of 
privilege persist and ‘the species [remains] as much an abstraction at the end of the line 
as at the source’.31  
  These patterns, I suggest, point directly towards the ‘Capitalocene’, which is, 
Haraway suggests, a more accurate term for the present epoch than the ‘Anthropocene’. 
2. Capitalocene: Entanglements of Law, Coloniality and Environmentality 
If the Anthropocene is have its full significance for environmental law, it must surely 
implicate the need to reflect upon the global juridical order. After all, as Haraway points 
out, the Anthropocene is intrinsically connected to the scale of the ‘global’, including in 
the policy imagination of bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Yet the global—as Haraway also points out (and as longstanding critiques of 
universalism converge to insist)—is also highly specific in terms of its historical and material 
origins and development.32 This specificity yet again raises the question of the identity of 
the Anthropos. If we were to use any single term to capture the trajectories leading to the 
current crisis and to the threatened mass extinction of species in the age of Anthropos, 
Haraway suggests, then that term should be ‘Capitalocene’.33   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and out of vulnerability to climate change: Abandoning the Mubarak Project in the northern Nile Delta 
Egypt’ (2012) 45 Antipode 474–492. Emphasis added. 
30 Haraway, n 1 above, at 6.36. 
31 Malm and Hornborg, n 10 above.	  
32 Haraway, n 1 above, at 14.02. 
33 Ibid, 16.35. 
  The ‘Capitalocene’ is a term that resonates deeply with critical legal accounts of 
the current international juridical order and its origins in European colonial predation.34 
Such critical accounts converge powerfully with Haraway’s description of the 
Capitalocene as a set of processes characterized by ‘primitive accumulations and 
extractions, organisations of labour and productions of technology of particular kinds for 
the extraction and maldistribution of profit’.35  
  Malm and Hornborg’s critical account of the ‘Anthropocene’ also strongly 
connects with critical accounts of the origins of the contemporary international legal 
order. Malm and Hornborg rightly argue that industrialization—the origins of the 
Anthropocene on the dominant account—was fundamentally capitalist in ambition and 
motivation—and inseparable from European (especially British) colonialism. The 
authors point out that the origins of the Anthropocene lie in an expansion of British 
appropriative power exercised through the deployment of steam-power as a weapon by 
‘an infinitesimal fraction of the population of Homo sapiens in the early 19th century’: 
A scrutiny of the transition to fossil fuels in 19th-century Britain . . . reveals the extent to 
which the historical origins of anthropogenic climate change were predicated on highly 
inequitable global processes from the start. The rationale for investing in steam 
technology at this time was geared to the opportunities provided by the constellation of 
a largely depopulated New World, Afro-American slavery, the exploitation of British 
labour in factories and mines, and the global demand for inexpensive cotton cloth. 
Steam-engines were not adopted by some natural-born deputies of the human species: 
by the nature of the social order of things, they could only be installed by the owners of 
the means of production. A tiny minority even in Britain, this class of people comprised 
an infinitesimal fraction of the population of Homo sapiens in the early 19th century. 
Indeed, a clique of white British men literally pointed steam-power as a weapon — on 
sea and land, boats and rails — against the best part of humankind, from the Niger delta 
to the Yangzi delta, the Levant to Latin America. Capitalists in a small corner of the 
Western world invested in steam, laying the foundation stone for the fossil economy.36 
While Haraway dates the origin of the Capitalocene in trade relations existing 
before the industrial revolution, capitalism’s long dependency upon a fossil fuel 
economy37 and the convergent nature of capitalist impulses in the genesis of the fossil 
fuel-dependent international legal order explain precisely why the global juridical 
structures now in place ‘lock in’ the dependency of the global economic system on fossil 
fuels38—and why the international legal order is dominated by Anthropos as ‘fossil-making 
man burning fossils’.  
  Anghie, in Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law,39 notes the 
combination of colonial suppression of ‘Third World’ peoples and the ambitions of 	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35 Haraway, n 1 above, at 16.51. 
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37 M Koch, Capitalism and Climate Change: Theoretical Discussion, Historical Development and Policy Responses 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012). See also, P Newell and M Paterson, Climate Capitalism: Global 
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38 J Dangerman and HJ Schellnhuber, ‘Energy Systems Transformation’ (2013) PNAS E549-E558 
(available at www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1219791110) (Date of last access: 18 Feb 2016). 
39 Anghie, n 34 above.  
Northern states for ‘natural resources’ to feed their increasingly industrialized social 
order as being key determinants of nineteenth century Northern colonial and imperial 
expansionism.40 He argues that the ‘importance of raw materials to the global economy 
was always well understood by the more powerful States’,41 and that ‘imperial expansion 
was powerfully motivated by the desire of colonial states to exploit the resources of non-
European territories’.42 In this highly uneven process, ‘Western trading and mining 
companies’ acquired ‘extraordinarily favourable’ terms in the then nascent system of 
colonial state relations, achieving such terms by a combination of direct force and legal 
sleight of hand in the form of ‘agreements, which possessing a legal form, were hardly 
comprehensible to the natives who were ostensibly signatories to them’.43 The very 
foundational purpose of international law was deeply capitalistic and predatory. As 
Simons puts it, 
[t]he underlying purpose of international law that was developed in the context of the 
colonial and post-colonial eras was precisely the promotion and protection of economic 
interests of the North. Thus, as newly independent states emerged from colonial rule as 
sovereign entities and attempted to assert their sovereignty and establish control over 
their natural resources, Northern states responded using legal doctrines such as state 
succession, acquired rights, contracts and consent to protect the interests of their 
corporate nationals in these states and to resist the attempts by these new sovereign 
actors to establish a new international economic order which included their own 
sovereignty over their natural resources’.44  
These dynamics are centrally important to understanding the climate crisis itself as a crisis 
of human hierarchy.45 Woven into this crisis of hierarchy—and inseparable from the 
rationalistic orders of valuation placed upon the human species—are the ecocidal 
implications of European rationalism and capitalism46 and the colonial practices and laws 
enacting those impulses.47 International law, capitalism and colonialism are all interwoven 
with Eurocentric (and now Global North) impulses and logics of action fully discernible 
the Anthropocene crisis. There is, therefore, great force in Haraway’s contention that the 
Anthropocene is better understood as the Capitalocene. The Anthropocene-Capitalocene 
is an epoch—after all—of eco-violation reflecting well-practiced, patterned and 
predictable global and globalizing distributions of intra-species and inter-species 
injustice.48 So foundational to the Anthropocene-Capitalocene are such injustices that the 
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current ecological crisis cannot really be understood without them.49   
  The ‘subject’ at the centre of the Anthropocene trope thus ineluctably reflects 
hierarchies foundational to European rationalism.50 Anthropos is in a very real sense, the 
quintessential European (and then ‘Western’) subject—and, accordingly, also law’s 
archetypical subject. This legal subject provides the ‘centre’ (the very site of mastery, 
panoptic in its knowledge51) set against ‘nature’ or ‘environment’ as the backdrop or 
context for the rational subject’s agency .52 Unsurprisingly, the subject-object 
relationalities of Anthropos are fully expressed in environmental law.  
  The rationality of Anthropos is the rationality that defines the subject-object 
relations undergirding methodological individualism and human exceptionalism. Such 
rationality, it must be recalled, only truly belongs to the masculinist Eurocentric trope—
all other human beings remain complexly immersed—to varying and shifting degrees—
in the relative irrationality of embodiment, the primitive, the feminised, the animal, the 
natural—in that which needs civilizing and/or ordering.53 This rationality was fully 
operative in coloniality and in the ‘civilizing mission’ of early European expansionism. A 
range of critical accounts of the colonial foundations of the international legal order thus 
thoroughly support Haraway’s contention that the current epoch is best captured by the 
terminology of the Capitalocene. And while Haraway argues that the Capitalocene pre-
dates the height of European colonial expansionism (in earlier trade relations), there can 
be no doubt that the Capitalocene reaches its apotheosis in the imperialistic drives and 
ambitions of capitalism as an imperialistic ideology.54 The figuration of the Capitalocene 
thus drives directly at the history and the present of the radical unevenness characterizing 
the contemporary neoliberal juridical order and its antecedent periods of primitive 
accumulation.55 It may even be an error to conflate trade with capitalism in the way that 
Haraway’s time frame suggests. 
  Turning now to an explicit consideration of environmental law, it could be 
argued that environmental law can be read as a reaction to the eco-destructiveness of the 
Anthropocene-Capitalocene, and to the ecological fallout of the imperatives driving it. 
However, even if that argument drives at a degree of reality, it is abundantly clear that 
environmental law is also entirely continuous with the assumptions at work in the 
Anthropocene-Capitalocene. 
 Reflecting first upon the environmental legal subject, it seems that environmental 
law’s central rational subject is none other than Anthropos. Indeed, the environmental 
legal subject, if anything, presents a site at which law’s relatively disembodied subject-	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object relations emerge with particular clarity: This subject stands emphatically at the 
assumed onto-epistemic ‘centre’ beyond which its ‘others’—especially ‘nature’ as ‘the 
environment’—range along a spectrum of objectifications. Environmental law’s 
quintessential subject, indeed, is the pivot around which ‘the environment’ revolves.56 
This rationalist, masterful subject is the very subject assumed by the rationalistic, 
hierarchical scales of value decisive to the expansion of European capitalist ambition 
across the globe.57 And even in these more eco-conscious times—even in the light of an 
Anthropocene awakening to the dark side of capitalism’s ‘progress’—marginalized, 
colonialized ‘others’ are rendered susceptible to acts and forms of domination legitimated 
by Global North assumptions of rationalistic superiority and mastery enacted from ‘the 
centre’.58 If anything, the centre-periphery trajectories implicit in the Anthropocene-
Capitalocene are more intense: The forms of eco-governmentality operationalized in 
contemporary environmental law—legitimated by the concern of ‘the centre’ with the 
‘global’ management of the planet in the name of various forms of ‘security’ (Global 
North security)—are widely accused of being intensifying spasms of neocolonial 
domination.59 For example, Luke, drawing on Foucault’s brilliant analysis of the 
production of biopolitical subjects and on the implications of Foucault’s analysis for the 
fate of ‘the environment’, argues that contemporary environmentalism (which includes 
environmental law and governance) enacts forms of eco-knowledge and geopower 
reflecting s a distinctively neoliberal ‘environmentality’.60  
  The subject-object relations of the Anthropocene-Capitalocene are fully visible in 
Luke’s analysis. First, there is the cut between humanity and ‘nature’ thoroughly implicit 
in Luke’s reflection upon how ‘nature’ became ‘environment’ as the result of ‘eco-
diction’—the discursive iteration through which ‘nature’ was made to ‘speak’ as 
‘environment’.61 This process, placed by Luke between the 1960s and the 1990s, 
produced a terminology that remains underdetermined, because even expert discourse on 
the environment, Luke argues, presents no clear definition of what ‘the environment’ 
actually is—other than something so all-embracing as to lack definitional precision.62 
Luke turns, in a search for clarity, to a genealogical analysis of the word ‘environment’, 
tracing it back to its historical linguistic roots. 
In its original sense, which is borrowed by English from Old French, an 
environment is an action resulting from, or the state of being produced by a verb: 
‘to environ’. And environ-ing as a verb is, in fact, a type of strategic action. To 
environ is to encircle, encompass, envelop, or enclose… to environ a site or a 
subject is to beset, beleaguer, or besiege that place or person. An environment, as 
either the means of such activity or the product of these actions, now might be 
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Studies 1–11. 
58 See, ibid, and Gonzalez, n 47 above. 
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61 Ibid, at 59. 
62 Ibid. 
read in a more suggestive manner. It is the encirclement, circumscription, or 
beleaguerment of places and persons in a strategic disciplinary policing of space.63 
This analysis, Luke continues, aptly exposes the nature of environmentalized places as 
‘sites of supervision’—‘environments can be disassembled, recombined and subjected to 
the disciplinary designs of expert management… redirected to fulfil the ends of other 
…scripts’: ‘Environing’, Luke argues, ‘engenders “environmentality”, which embeds 
instrumental rationalities in the policing of ecological spaces’.64 In short, Luke’s analysis 
reflects the governmentality of Anthropocene-Capitalocene subject-object relations, with 
their long provenance in the Cartesian foundations of the modern worldview: In a sense, 
what Luke describes is precisely a logic of rational agency carving ‘nature’ up (always set 
against the subject’s panoptic mastery) into ‘environment’—the dicing and slicing of the 
living order into eco-enclosures.  
  And unsurprisingly, such environmentality reflects predictable Capitalocene 
trajectories, ordering the entrenched concatenation of colonialisms, appropriations and 
maldistributions of profit and—increasingly—the commodification and financialization 
of ‘nature’ itself. ‘The environment’ is an increasingly policed space for impulses of 
financial accumulation, expressing logics of (capitalistic, Global North-favouring) 
development discourse as a rationalisation for neoliberal governmentality.65 As Luke puts 
it, as ‘new mediations of development and growth were constructed after 1945, the geo-
power/eco-knowledge nexus of environmentalization came to comfortably supplement 
the high technology, capital intensive development strategies that have since been 
implemented’.66  
  The scripts driving such acts of environing are profoundly neoliberal—and 
profoundly continuous with early colonizing impulses lying at the dark heart of the 
Anthropocene-Capitalocene. The resource managerialism at the heart of contemporary 
responses to environmental challenges is operationalized by dense networks of 
corporate-managerial-administrative regulatory regimes facilitating a spectacular range of 
‘land grabs’ and dispossessions in the name of ‘environmental protection’. Whether in 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (the CBD), or in practices around food and 
biofuels production, there is an extensive, planetary land grab underway, driven by the 
‘rational planning of the planet for Northern security’.67 This management falls out into 
the extensive and intensive ‘environing’ of the Global South—fully visible in predatory 
patterns of dispossession and domination that reflect the long histories of enclosure, land 
grab and dispossession long associated with capitalism and its voracious, colonizing 
dynamics. 
  Accordingly, the subject assumed by environmental law—the meta-agency 
expressed through environmental legal rationality—is, in the final analysis, Anthropos as 
‘fossil-making’ man re-birthing himself: Anthropoos re-presented as eco-trope rationalizing 
forms of geopower and eco-knowledge in the name of ‘ecological sustainability’, the 
‘global commons’, ‘food security’ and other forms of future-facing ‘justifications’ 
deployed in service of the Capitalocene. Indeed, the burning of fossils is now facilitated by 
market mechanisms enabling carbon leakage and unjust distributions of responsibility.68 	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Meanwhile, the eco-market mandates the commodification of biodiversity and generates 
new speculative forms of deadly commodities trading on species extinction, food crisis, 
water shortage and the like.  
  The subject of environmental law in the Capitalocene increasingly enacts 
iteratively deepening forms neoliberal eco-governmentality—and—as Luke argues, ‘to 
the degree that modern subjectivity is a two-sided power/knowledge relation, scientific-
professional declarations… essentially describe a new mode of environmentalized 
subjectivity’.69 
  What hope and what forms of environmental law and perhaps even insurgent 
eco-subjectivity might the trope of the Chthulucene offer?  
3. Chthulucene—materiality’s semiosis and the future of environmental legal subjectivity 
At the heart of the questions just posed lies a central challenge: can environmental law 
exceed the centripetal impulse of neoliberal governmentality? Can environmental law 
respond to alternative modes of knowing and coordination? Can environmental law 
respect multiple forms of sharing the world?  
  Such sharing would need to recognize the companion status of all species and 
systems entangled in the dance of life itself—to reflect, in short, the grounding, complex 
energies of the Chthulucene.  
  Let us reflect first upon Haraway’s framing of the Chthulucene. Haraway 
emphasizes two main thoughts: first, she points to the way in which biology is shattering 
the myth of human exceptionalism and individualism, arguing that ‘[w]e are all lichens 
now. We have never been individuals. From anatomical, physiological, evolutionary, 
developmental, philosophic, economic, I don’t are what perspective, we are all lichens 
now’.70 Haraway emphasizes, also, the tentacularity associated with the Chthulucene. 
Chthulu is the lead character in a famous short story, The Call of Chthulu, published in 
1926, a creation of HP Lovecraft.71 The story sparked the development of the Chthulu 
Mythos, a shared invented universe. The name Chthulu is likely drawn from the word 
‘chthonic’, meaning ‘subterranean’, with its invocations of the underworld. Chthulu is 
part-octopus, part-man, part-dragon, and his head is tentacled—an image reflected by 
Haraway’s deployment of similar images of facial tentacularity on slides drawn from 
science fiction. Tentacularity, I suggest, has distinctive epistemological implications that 
will be explored below. For now, however, we will turn our attention back to the 
significance of the claim that ‘we are all lichens now’.  
  Haraway’s claim refers to a phrase from Scott Gilbert, who (with Sapp and 
Tauber) proposes the necessity for a symbiotic view of life, insisting that ‘we have never 
been individuals’.72 Gilbert et al begin by noting the way in which individualism, which 
emerged ‘with the appearance of the independent citizen’ (a quintessentially Eurocentric 
construction reflecting the ontology of Anthropos) shaped biological assumptions 
concerning the existence of individual animals, plants and the like, before such 
individualist assumptions gave way to systems as complements to individuals in the 
second half of the nineteenth century with the emergence of ecology.73 With the 
emergence of ecology, the rigidly binary Cartesian separation between (disembodied, 	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rational) humanity and the rest begins to fray, although it is clear from the phrasing used 
by Gilbert et al that the individual continued, even with the emergence of new system-
facing conceptions, to be regarded as an ontologically significant referent. Gilbert et al 
note, however, that new technologies problematize the status of individuality (and, 
necessarily therefore, individualism). Hence, new technologies already in existence 
 
dramatically transform our conceptions … [and] have not only revealed a microbial 
world of complex and intermingled relationships—not only among microbes, but also 
between microscopic and macroscopic life. These discoveries have profoundly 
challenged the generally accepted view of “individuals”. Symbiosis is becoming a core 
principle of contemporary biology, and it is replacing an essentialist conception of 
“individuality” with a conception congruent with the larger systems approach now 
pushing the life sciences in diverse directions. These findings lead us into directions that 
transcend the self/non-self, subject-object dichotomies that have characterized Western 
thought.74  
 
Turning then to Haraway’s insistence that we are all lichens, it is clear that she is pointing 
to a biological reality capable, if we embrace it, of fundamentally transforming the 
boundaries of the thinkable. Lichens have been defined as ‘symbiotic associations 
between two (or sometimes more) entirely different types of microorganism’.75 
Importantly, though, unlike the many other examples of symbiosis common in the living 
order, ‘lichens are unique because they look and behave quite differently from their 
component organisms. So lichens are regarded as organisms in their own right…’.76 
Gilbert, Sapp and Tauber argue that all ‘animals are symbiotic complexes of many species 
living together’.77 This includes humans. ‘We’ are lichen now, and increasingly 
recognizing ourselves as such, because new technologies enable a fuller appreciation of 
the symbiotic generativity of life. In a symbiotic view, the ‘all’ of the ‘we’ is profoundly 
interspecies—(or intra-species if we count ‘earthlings’ in an all embracing way)—a lively 
entanglement of beings and systems that are never individual in the traditional Western 
sense. Haraway’s Chthulucene is a world relational ‘all the way down’—and framing the 
Chthulucene as an epoch is an invitation to celebrate the porous hybridities, the tangles 
and knots and dynamic materialities of the world at multiple scales. 
  The interwoven becomings and symbiotic complexes at the heart of this 
invitation are particularly well reflected by New Materialism as a broad contemporary 
school of thought. Just as the biological sciences incontrovertibly reveal the radical 
continuities between complex lively relationalities at all scales, from the microscopic to 
the macroscopic, so New Materialist accounts point to the assemblages between multiple 
factors that operate at multiple scales. New Materialists also point towards the lively 
meaning-making capacities of materiality itself—to materiality’s semiosis.  
  Embracing and responding to the ethical implications of materiality seems 
fundamentally urgent if environmental law is to become responsive to the implications 
and promise of the Chthulucene. Indeed, as Coole and Frost argue in the opening 
sentences of their book, New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency and Politics,78 ‘foregrounding 
material factors and reconfiguring our very understanding of matter are prerequisites for 	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any plausible account of co-existence and its conditions in the 21st century’.79  
  Indeed, foregrounding material factors and reconfiguring our very understanding 
of matter will necessarily transform law’s fundamental construct of ‘the environment’ 
because what is at stake is precisely ‘nothing less than a challenge to some of the most 
basic assumptions that have underpinned the modern world, including its normative 
sense of the human and its beliefs about human agency, but also regarding its material 
practices such as the ways we labor on, exploit and interact with nature’.80 Environmental 
law’s existing ontology is profoundly at stake in New Materialist insights that go to very 
heart of the question of what matter is and, relatedly, to the question of what the ethical 
implications of matter are. If matter has escaped its imposed (imagined) inertia—if matter 
begins to evade categorizations, to over-spill linear conceptions of causality, to generate 
meanings—then matter necessarily challenges the previous taken for granted of 
environmental law. Cartesian subject-object relations are thus thoroughly challenged by 
an understanding of matter as ‘materialization [,] a complex, pluralistic, relatively open 
process’ in which ‘humans [are] thoroughly immersed within materiality’s productive 
contingencies’.81 And since, matter has its own lively agencies, ‘the conventional sense 
that agents are exclusively humans who possess cognitive abilities, intentionality and 
freedom to make autonomous decisions and the corollary presumption that humans 
have the right or ability to master nature’ is entirely disrupted.82 Taken seriously, such 
disruption strikes at the very heart of the anthropocentric assumptions underlying the 
eco-governmentality expressed in the environmental legal priorities of the Capitalocene.  
 Such lively complexity, taken seriously, has further implications. Key among 
these are its implications for the environmental legal subject. The individualistic, 
exceptionalist human agent ‘acting on’ or ‘governing’ ‘the environment’ becomes an 
intellectually unsustainable idea. Matter’s lively, self-emergent properties and the sense in 
which ‘we are all lichens now’ folds human flesh and the generation of human meaning 
into a much wider field of materio-semiotic energies. The de-centred subject is presented 
with a demand for epistemic humility, re-positioned as just one partner in a ‘spatial and 
temporal web of interspecies dependencies’.83 Environmental epistemology thus 
becomes ecological.84 And environmental subjects are themselves ecologies85—and seen as 
such, in place of the panoptic subject radically separated from ‘the environment’ it ‘acts 
upon’.   
  What then, might such realizations indicate in practical terms?  
  First, there is a need to foreground materiality and its significance. The way in 
which New Materialist thought transversally dissolves the material/cultural dualism so 
long assumed by Cartesianism and its conceptual descendants necessarily broadens and 
deepens the focus of theoretical vision. As Coole and Frost suggest, New Materialist 
frames of analysis draw together the effects of macro-structural projects such as the 
international economy, ‘well-honed micro-powers of governmentality’ and the sheer 
materiality of existence as corporeal beings inhabiting ‘a world of natural and artificial 
objects’ and having biological needs.86 Environmental legal thought, likewise, could 	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embrace the ‘elements’ interacting at various different levels (‘micro, meso and macro’), 
and respond to the fact that dynamics are multi-directional rather than moving in the 
traditionally conceived top-down ways assumed by environmental law and governance 
structures or by uni-directional bottom-up responses. Interrelationalities should be seen 
as rhizomatic rather than arboreal.  
  For the environmental legal subject, New Materialist thought necessarily means 
that the focus moves away from ‘individual bodies, subjects, experiences or sensations’ 
towards ‘assemblages of human and non-human, animate and inanimate, material and 
abstract, and the affective flows within these assemblages’.87 Indeed, it makes sense—as 
Barad has argued—to eschew the notion of a stable subject-object split entirely.  
  This shift will be profoundly challenging for an environmental law that continues 
to assume its broadly Cartesian ontology of the subject. That said, law is not a stranger to 
shifts of meaning—and environmental law is closer than many forms of law to the 
materiality of the world and potentially responsive to materiality as an ethical matter. Law 
is in any case, adaptive. Law both attempts to ‘capture’, ‘fix’ and ‘stabilize’ meanings and 
referents for coordinative/control purposes—but law also destabilizes meanings, not 
least through legal argument, interpretive variance and the semiotic shifts operationalized 
by appeal processes. It is not impossible to believe that environmental law’s particular 
focus on material relations could, if pursued into Chthulucene realities, hold out hope for 
environmental law as a conduit of more liveable futures.  
  And while the destabilization of fixed subject-object relations presents a 
particularly profound challenge to law’s assumption of the construct of the rational 
juridical individual, it is just possible to imagine the environmental legal subject as a 
contingent position relevant to a particular context or purpose. And if environmental law 
can face up to the fact that such choices represent a contingent ‘fixing’ of an underlying 
complexity, then perhaps environmental law, within parameters responsive to its own 
nature, including its institutional dynamics, can become more radically responsive to the 
materiality it seeks to engage with.  
  Relatedly, the de-centering of the environmental legal subject has distinctive 
epistemological implications. If the subject becomes a contingent identification, not a 
fixed a priori designation of an exceptionalist status, then the subject’s knowledge, 
likewise, is de-centred. The dethroning of the epistemology of mastery (the dissolution of 
the ‘eye in the sky’) necessarily brings the politics of epistemic location88 centre-frame for 
environmental law and legal process. De-centering epistemic power challenges the 
panoptic ‘knowing centre’ at the heart of intensifying levels of eco-governmentality and 
the neoliberalisation of nature under the imperatives of the Capitalocene. Environmental 
law and environmental legal enquiry are invited by such foundational shifts to become 
overtly reflexive, alert to premature closure and to the overly rigid fixing of boundaries 
drawn for theoretical, operational or doctrinal purposes.  
  Environmental law is also invited by such insights to broaden its epistemic 
‘receptor sites’, and to embrace a form of epistemic tentacularity. If environmental law 
and methodologies were to ‘begin in the middle’89 rather than ‘at the centre’, and if 
environmental epistemology were to abandon the panoptic for a tentacular exploration 
of materiality, then the entire epistemic focus of environmental law could include 
previously unconsidered constituencies of meaning-making. Tentacularity (and the partial 
knowing that such an epistemic approach might even celebrate) points towards a fully 
‘ecological epistemology’.90 An ecological epistemology, in the words of Lorraine Code, 	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‘emerges from and addresses so many interwoven and sometimes contradictory issues ... 
that its implications require multifaceted chartings’.91 Importantly, such an epistemology 
is characterised, first and foremost, by responsible epistemic practices particularly 
sensitive to local, situated diversities and ‘proposes a way of engaging—if not all at 
once—with the implications of patterns, places and the interconnections of lives and 
events in and across the human and nonhuman world ... in projects of inquiry ... where 
epistemic and ethical-political concerns are reciprocally informative’.92 A tentacular 
epistemology would, I suggest, necessarily feel its way along particular, situated puzzles 
and questions, inviting a mode of knowing that was knowingly incomplete and open to 
perceptual ambiguity in a way that invites epistemic relationality—of all kinds, including 
interspecies engagements—into epistemic relationalities. And examples of legal epistemic 
strategies along (and/or analogous to) such lines of approach already exist.  
  Pieraccini, for example, explores materio-semiotic inter-species encounters 
between sheep and humans on upland commons in the United Kingdom (UK): There, it 
is the bodily habits and repetitions, practices, movements, modes of stopping and of 
dwelling of sheep that are used to guide property relations and to suggest new ways of 
seeing property as being, in the words of Pieraccini, the ‘contingent product of humans 
and non-human animals’.93 There is a kind of ecological epistemology at work in such 
partnerships of knowing. There is a kind of tentacularity in the way that the community 
feels its way along, guided by animal movements and habits in a dance with the slower 
movement of landscape—a most lichen-like ‘mutual and dynamic crafting of people and 
environments’.94 Such an ecological epistemology would exceed environmental law’s 
traditional epistemic mono-culturalism to allow (and by allowing) non-human intelligences 
and agencies their place in the formation of legal and normative relations. 
 An environmental law responsive to the Chthulucene might just be able to cast 
aside the eco-destructive assumptions and ideological closures of the Anthropocene-
Capitalocene. The newly de-centred environmental subject would no longer stand at the 
‘centre’ of a world rendered oppressively fungible and commodified. Then, perhaps, 
environmental law might, by responding to the energies of the Chthulucene, become an 
important mode of coordinating ‘something—just maybe—more liveable’.95 
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